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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~IARION W. MALMSTROM, 
Plain tiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THERON c .. OLSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10110 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
B~\SIS FOR PETITION FOR RE·HEARING 
The respondent, Theron C. Olsen, respectfully 
~ubmits the decision of the Court rendered herein 
on :\larch 19, 1965 reversing the trial court's non-
suit judgment in favor of the respon·dent does not 
apply the proper legal stJan·dard in determining 
\vhether appellant ·had produced sufficient evidence 
to allo\v the jury to determine the respon·dent's al-
leged malpractice, and that this Court should grant 
respondent's petition for rehearing and consider its 
pre,·ious decision. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CO'URT DID NOT AP.PLY A PROPER STAN-
DARD IN DETERMINING WHE'THER THE APPEL-
LANT H.A:D PRESENTE'D SUFFJCTENT EVIDENCE 
FROM WHICH A JURY ·C·OULD CON'C.LUDE T'HE RE-
SPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF MAUPRACTICE. 
It is respe~tfully submitted th~at the evidence 
offered at the trial of the instant case will not sup-
port a judgment of malpractice based upon a theory 
that 'the actions of the respondent and the claimed 
resulting injury were such that a jury could reason-
ably conclude the respondent !h1ad departed from 
\accepted treatment standards for ·chiropractors. 
'The fact ·as presented in the trial ·court showed 
that the appellant went to respondent, a chiroprac-
tor, because of previotls back pain. She sought treat-
ment for her back although she had not previously 
experienced difficulty with her neck. She received 
a treatment, including 1the m1anipulation of 'her neck, 
which tre'atment including the neck treatment was 
similar to what she had experienced in the past 
(R-1'13, 114). The only eh·ange was that she experi-
enced a pain in her neck. She did not become ill, vom-
it, or faint. That the treatment given at that time 
by the respondent was n·dt so obviously 'improper, 
appears from the fact that the appellant returned 
the next day for further treatment (R-48). She 
'then experienced somewhat the same treatment as 
the day before. Again there was no immediate im-
pairment or onset of pain. Supporting the conclu-
2 
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~ion that appellant, a nurse, did not conclude that 
anything extraordinary had occurred as a result of 
the trPan1ent is the fact th·at thereafter she went 
on a vacation for nine days, and experienced no 
additional discomfort, ·but rather the pain subsided 
(R-92). 
1\t no tilne did the appellant, who is the only 
one ousicle of the respondent most likely to know 
ho\v n1uch force was used in manipulating her neck, 
testify that the respondent "violently" jer'ked her 
neck. She silnply said the treatment involved rough 
jerks ( R-47, 49). 
The Court apparently feels that this evidence 
flagrantly demonstrates 1a failure to use proper 
chiropractic standards 'that a layman can conclude 
the conduct of respondent was m'alpractice. In sup-
pol't of the majority conclusion, the Court relies on 
ll"alkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 
(1937) <.:tnd Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 
227 P.2d 772 ( 1951). It is apparent from a re'ading 
of these cases that they do not involve facts similar 
to those in the instant ·case, nor provide any basis 
for a conclusion that the fa~ts in this case justify 
a decision of 1nalpracti'ce merely because of the al-
leged results. In Walkenho1·~t, the defendant, a 
chiropractor, stepped outside his field and sought 
to diagnose a disease. He failed to recognize an 
obYious infection and inflam1ation of the ;hip which 
'vould be recognizable as something more th·an rheu-
n1atisn1. Such facts are In no way comparable to 
the instant case. 
3 
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In the Fredrickson ease, 1a surgeon left materials 
in a wound. This is a recognized and obvious ex-
ception to the general rule requiring expert testi-
mony of malpractice. McCoid, Lwbility of Medical 
Pr:actitioners, Professional Negligence, p. 7 4 ( 1960). 
The facts in Fredrickson support no conclusion of 
negligence in this instant case. Consequently, the 
precedent directly relied on by the m1ajority of the 
Court affords no legal basis for the conclusion 
reached. 
The majority cites the case of Farrah v. Pattou, 
99 Colo. 41, 59 P.'2d 76 (1986) as being "very 
similar" to the instant ·case. Again, reading of that 
case shows th·at i't is in opposite to the facts here 
presented. In F~arr~ah, the plaintiff experienced a 
'~terrific jerk" or "yank" on the neck followed by 
the immediate onset of intense pain, paralysis and 
vomiting. Further, the defendant himself acknowl-
edged 'he had been a ''little rough''. This case is ob-
viously not "very similar" to the instant case and, 
in fact, is obviously greatly different ~and more 
aggravated in action an·d symptom. Further, 'the 
Court fails to note a subsequent Colorado case where 
the facts were almost identical with those in the 
instant case. In Klimkiewicz v. Karnick, 372 P.2d 
736 (Colo., 1962), the Colorado Su~preme Court re-
versed a judgment for plain'tiff under the facts of 
the instant cas.e because the ;trial court h!ad in-
structed the jury in a manner that would have al-
lowed ~a finding of negligence without a 'finding of 
4 
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son1e departure from recognized chiropractic treat-
ment. In its opinion, the Court stated the facts 1and 
noted that the standard of care for the profession 
mu~t be proved. It stated: 
''The plaintiff does not claim improper diag-
nosis; she expressly admits that 1the technique 
tha1t defendant alleges he used as proper chiro-
prt~tic treatment and that the method which 
demonstrated as th·at used was proper. Thus 
we find that plaintiff's complaint is confined 
to the fact th·at defendant gave her arm a 
'tremendous yank'. This was part of the !ad-
mitted 'proper chiropractic treatment'. In giv-
ing this 'tremendous yank' as related by plain-
tiff, or in applying '·a mild firm extension 
. . . to the arm', ·as related by defendant -
no matter which version is correct- ·fue ·de-
fendant's actions were those of a doctor under 
contractural obligations, and the propriety of 
the s·ame must be measured ·by the rules gov-
erning one in his position.'' 
No proof of the standard of care for the chiroprac-
tic profession was offered in the instant case. 
The Court h1as simply allowed the result to 
sustain a finding of negligence without showin·g a 
departure from procedure or ~hat 'the result could 
not have occurred with proper procedure. 'This is 
rontraray to all medical jurisprudence under simi-
lar facts. A practitioner does not warrant his re-
sults; it must be shown by substantial evidence not 
"conjecture or speculation". Anderson v. Nixon,, 104 
Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943). Chiropracti'cs by 
5 
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definition involves the palpation and manipulation 
of the body, Kalkenhorst v. Kesler, supra, which is 
the treatment respondent performed. Nor does the 
fact that a ruptured disc resul1ted demonstrate the 
'abandonment of proper technique since a ruptured 
disc may result from trivial impact or actions asso-
ciated wifu less than accepted pressure tolerance. 
Gelfand-M·agana, Courtroom Medicine-The Low 
B~ack, §§ 11.42-44; Ballard & Ballard v. Pelaia, 73 
So.'2d 840 (Fla., 1954) , where the Florida Court 
stated: 
" ... It is common medical knowledge that a 
ruptured dise frequently arises from an ap-
parently trivial injury.'' 
Indeed such factors as previous back trouble, 
pre-disposition, age, degeneration, skeletal prob-
lems are factors that may effect an action resulting 
in a ruptured di~sc. ·These factors, the correct treat-
ment to be used under the circumstances and the 
question of whether the results and circums'tances 
show negligence obviously are areas where judg-
ment, eX!perience, medical conditioning ·and training 
are involved and thus an area requiring expert testi-
mony not lay supposition. 
It is difficult to see how the majority can dis-
tinguis1h the legal basis of the case of Marsh v. Pem-
berton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (195'9) from 
the instant case. There, this Court required expert 
testimony to prove negligence from a cast which was 
too tight. A tight cast involves the question of pres-
6 
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~urc, the use of judgment and medical technique. 
Palpation and manipulation of the spine also con-
cern the same elements thus necessitating expert 
tt)stimony on the isstle of negligence. 
The only conclusion that follows is that in case 
against tnedical doctors, the legal standard of proof 
of negligence is different from th·at of a chiroprac-
tor, a conclusion which is legally unsound. Such a 
result defeats logic and obviously could not h1ave 
been intended. This Court should on re'hearing adopt 
the minority position and affirm the trial court. 
CON·CLUSION 
It seems inescapable that the m·ajori'ty of the 
Court have confused ~he concept of proof of negli-
gence with proof of proximate cause and thus great-
ly expanded the exception to the geneiia:l rule that 
1nalpractice n1ust be shown ·by expert testimony. In 
doing so, the Court is making a legislative judgment 
based on a policy of holding chiropractors responsible 
for their results without ·any re·al proof of negli-
gence except from the results, which is a tauto-
logical result. It is submitted the majority of the 
Court has erred and reh~aring ·should be granted. 
Respectfully submrtted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Ther011 C. Olsen 
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